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How looking at language, not stockpiles, helps explain the latest
dispute over Iran’s ballistic missile program.
Despite the success of the 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1, Iran-US relations
continue to follow a well-worn acrimonious path as demonstrated by the latest dispute over Iran’s
ballistic missile program. What is preventing the full normalization of relations between the two
states? Constance Duncombe writes that underneath the international, domestic and personal
dynamics feeding into opposing US and Iranian positions on the ballistic missile program, binary
representations of Self and Other continue to contribute to misrecognition, exacerbating tensions
between the two countries. 
Last month, the US Treasury Department blacklisted two Iranian companies for their involvement in Iran’s ballistic
missile program. These sanctions followed several ballistic missile tests by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
(IRGC), causing US concern about the threat posed by Iranian missile development. In response, Iran’s Foreign
Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, stated last week that discussions about Iran’s missile program were off the table.
Countering US claims about the danger of such tests to the Middle East and international community as ‘baseless
and threadbare allegations’, Zarif suggested the US look to its allies to explain the growth of Islamic State and
regional instability. So far, so normal for Iran-US relations. However, this latest stoush has come at a time when
relations between the two states had been more cordial, following the historic nuclear deal in July 2015. Despite
positive moves on both sides in implementing the nuclear deal, why do we continue to witness persistent retreats
from normalized relations? 
An important clue to this complex problem can be found in the language used by both the US and Iran to talk about
each other. Since the 1979-81 Hostage Crisis, pejorative representations have continued to permeate
communication from both sides, such as ‘Great Satan’, ‘rogue state’, ‘terrorist’. Any dialogue between the two
states, initiated and managed by third party representatives, has been subject to deep and mutual feelings of
mistrust and suspicion that emerge from the representations each state has of the other, affecting how Iran
recognises the US and vice versa.
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‘Emad’ ballistic missile, Tasnim News Agency (CC by 4.0)
Why is language important? Binary representations of Self and Other (where groups or individuals centre
themselves compared to a different person or group which they see as being unlike or antithetical) inform the
identity narratives of each state and how they are recognised. These representations are deeply embedded in Iran-
US relations. Representations of Self and Other contribute to misrecognition and restrict what foreign policy options
are available to both states. They exacerbate tensions between Iran and the US, fostering a feeling of disrespect as
the states engage with each other.
Overall US representations of itself imagine the state as a world leader and a force for good, while Iran is
represented as dangerous and irrational. Comparatively, Iranian representations of itself produce an image of a
strong, progressive Shi’a state. Its rhetoric challenges the US representation of Iranian inferiority and instead paints
the US as a bully focused on undermining Iran.
Take one representation the US employs about itself: that it is acting with the support of and on behalf of the
international community. In doing so, it normalises the representation of Iran as the irrational, isolated Other. This
representation stems from a cost-benefit logic taking into account the sacrifices Iran had made to continue its
nuclear program. The US has imposed rounds of sanctions on Iran, restricting US investment in or transfer of
technical knowledge to Iran, including the sale of refined petroleum. That Iran continued to assert its right to enrich
uranium under Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), sacrificing significant
elements of its state welfare in the process, supported the US belief that the Islamic Republic was not behaving
rationally.
One way the rational US vs. irrational Iran representation evolves within foreign policy was through US
preoccupation with preventing the Iranians from building nuclear weapons. The US has been convinced that the
Islamic Republic would eventually produce a nuclear weapon, despite US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)
reports from 2007 and 2011 confirming there was no irrefutable evidence Iran had nuclear weapons. Nevertheless
the US believed the Iranian nuclear program posed an ‘urgent and potentially very dangerous challenge ’ to
international security. Even the argument that was run by ‘perfectly sane Ayatollahs ’ failed to dissuade
representations to the contrary. For instance, on the eve of the nuclear deal US Senate Republicans issued an open
letter to Iran stating any executive agreement between Obama and Khamenei relating to the nuclear negotiations
could be ‘revoked with the stroke of a pen’.
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Khamenei Twitter post, 25 July 2015
Meanwhile Iranian representations of the US follow the Self-Other pattern, however the main representative
schemas are split between provocative religious images and those that represent the US as a master manipulator.
With the former, Iran uses the sobriquet ‘Great Satan’. With the latter, the US is represented as a hypocritical bully.
Here the historical grievance of the 1953 Mossadegh Coup arises. The 1953 coup d’état saw the popularly elected
Prime Minister Mossadegh overthrown by the British and the CIA. Iran thus discursively resists US dominance by
challenging the US representation of itself as leader of the international community as it has acted outside the
framework of international law. Instead it represents the US as hypocritical.
Such representations suggest Iran feels pressured by the
US and is resisting this pressure through affirmations of
revolutionary Shi’ite identity. This is built up in two ways:
firstly, through the suggestion that US power allows the
state to behave towards Iran without consequence, such as
its continued imposition of sanctions against Iran. Secondly,
Iran resists US dominance through its own actions, such as
continuing its enrichment activities despite increasing
sanctions and diplomatic pressure. Although Iranian
President Hassan Rouhani has pushed for greater dialogue
between the two states, representations of the US as a
fraudulent, self-imposed leader remain strong.
It is remarkable how powerful the representations are that
exist within Iran-US relations. Representations have
influenced not only how each state recognises the other, but
also what foreign policy options each believes are available
as a result. Both Iranian and US experiences of these
representations act to securitize notions of ‘threat’ or
‘danger’, reinforcing mistrust in the foreign policy choices of each state. Most importantly, these representational
dynamics suggest that both US and Iranian actions – including the recent dispute over Iran’s ballistic missile
program – may be better explained in terms of a struggle for recognition. Until these representations are challenged
more forcefully, they will continue to disrupt efforts towards Iran-US rapprochement.
This article is based on the paper, ‘Representation, Recognition and Foreign Policy in the Iran-US Relationship’ in
the European Journal of International Relations DOI: 10.1177/1354066115597049.
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